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Abstract 
In 2016 the Dutch government decided to fully switch to a farmer collectives agri-environmental service 
provision system. The focus is therewith on creating good habitat conditions for rare species (territorial 
based) instead of commitments on farm level. The paper describes and analyses the organisational 
framework and links it to the Dutch tradition of environmental cooperatives. Issues of collective action, 
transaction costs, information problems, effectiveness, accountability, and procurement efficiency are 
analysed in a qualitative way. It is concluded that the Dutch model is promising, although not without 
risks. 
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1. Introduction  
Since the introduction of the second pillar of the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) (as part of the 
Agenda 2000 policy reform), the EU’s rural development (RDP) policy aims to strengthen the 
sustainability and greening of agriculture, by providing payment schemes which actively promote the 
provision of green services. A main policy instrument are the agri-environmental schemes (AES) that are 
offered to farmers and which pays them a compensation in return for having them providing certain 
environmental management services or taking measures that contribute to the realization of pre-defined 
policy objectives regarding biodiversity and landscape preservation. AES measures are part of the EU’s 
rural development policy (2nd pillar of the CAP) and the annual EU-28 spending on AES-measures 
amounts about 3 billion euro (due to co-financing obligations the total expenditure about €5.5 billion, an 
amount comparable to the USDA’s expenditure on conservation programs).  
Several studies question the ecological, costs effectiveness and design of the schemes currently applied 
(Klein and Sutherland, 2003, Slangen et al, 2008a, Klein, 2011, ECA, 2011). The mixed effects found 
indicate that the overtime increasing efforts have not been sufficient to halt the decline in biodiversity 
(e.g. Fisher et al, 2011). Moreover, evidence shows that by being arbitrary with respect to location and 
conditions where AES-schemes are adopted (e.g. the voluntary participation) the ecological effectiveness 
can become poor. 
In 2010 about 14 thousand Dutch farmers (20%) participated in AES schemes and the total area under 
management amounted to more than 143,000 ha  (share about 8% of total agricultural land) (Agrimatie; 
Melman et al., 2016). In 2012 they brought about 60 thousand hectare into the AES-scheme, which 
represents about 5% of the agricultural area (EU-27 average in 2009 was 21%; Eurostat, 2012). Since 
1999 the degree of participation declined. Moreover, it became more and more clear that a decline in 
farm land biodiversity could only be reversed through cross-farm approaches. This especially applied to 
the Dutch situation, whereas farmland birds and ecological corridors are important conservation targets 
(Terwan, 2016). Up till 2016 the Dutch government procures agri-environmental services by contracting 
individual farmers, which is the classical model in the EU. Since 2016 onward the Dutch government only 
procures agri-environmental services by contracting with groups of farmers, organized as farmer 
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collectives (MEA, 2013). It hopes that by following a farmer collective (FC) approach rather than 
individual farmer (IF) approach it might on the one hand improve the performance of the policy while, on 
the other hand, it may lead to a reduction in costs for the government (Mulders, 2018). The Netherlands 
is the first, and so far only, EU Member State following such an FC approach, although also several other 
member states have examples of farmer collaboration groups (Westerink et al, 2017).  
In its November 2017 Communication about the Future of Food and Farming, the European Commission 
proposes to have a more flexible approach to AES service provision, which makes it more interesting to 
learn from the Dutch FC pilot-example, even though a full impact evaluation of it is not yet available. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it describes the specifics of the Dutch farmer group approach. 
Second, it analyses a number of procurement aspects of contracting AES service provision via farmer 
collectives.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the Dutch farmer 
group approach, how this is structured, the organisational requirements it should satisfy, the role of 
different actors and institutions, etc. It also links this description of the FC approach with the past IF cum 
environmental cooperatives-approach, which is the EU’s current classical approach. In the following 
sections key issues associated with efficient procurement in collective agri-environmental contracting are 
discussed, exploiting insights from the literature on public and private procurement (e.g. Latacz-
Lohmann et al, 1997; 2007; 2009). From this literature it turns out that there are several factors that 
are crucial in determining the properties of the final outcome. These factors are: 
• A characterization of the basic parameters defining the procurement setting (e.g. monopsony-
buyer situation) (section 3); 
• Contract specification by the buyer and the specifics of the contracting due to the peculiarities of 
the public good or green service to be contracted (section 4), including: 
o Contract incompleteness 
o Contract type and reward structure 
• Frequency of (re)contracting and expected design-changes after the contract is signed (section 
5). 
Section 6 closes with a number of concluding remarks. 
2. Farmer collective action and the provision of agri-environmental services 
The Dutch agri-environmental policy started in the seventies of the last century with a policy paper on 
the linkage between farming and nature and landscape management (Rijksoverheid, 1975). Schemes 
were introduced that enabled farmers to protect agricultural landscapes and at the same time to provide 
farmers with a reasonable income. The reference for the compensation was the farm income in 
comparable areas without agri-environmental restrictions (see Polman, 2002 and Polman, 2009). At the 
end of the 1980s, the basis switched to income forgone calculated using extra labour input and cost for 
agri-environmental management. There was also a movement from relatively simple agreements, 
requiring relatively few and minor adjustment of farming practices, to packages having more severe 
impacts. From 2000 onwards, the Dutch policy has been aligned with the European agri-environmental 
policies (Regulation EU 1257/99).  In 2007, provinces became the contracting partner for farmers 
implying delegation of public governance from the state to the regions.  
The IF and ANV environmental cooperatives 
The Netherlands has a tradition in farmer groups as the first farmer group-approaches to agri-
environmental management in the Netherlands were already established in the early 1990s. The number 
of farmer groups or cooperatives (hereafter labelled by the Dutch acronym ANV) grew steadily to about 
150 in 2005. The majority of the ANVs had been established in the period 1995-2005. The average 
number of members of the ANVs has grown as well in this period. The area covered by ANVs ranges from 
a few 100 hectares to more than 15.000 hectares. Most groups have been operating for more than 15 
years. When they get older and more mature their yearly growth in numbers of participants decreases. 
The ANVs can be quite heterogeneous, as they differ in size and type of activities. This can partly by 
explained by the physical environment in which they are operating, which ranges from large scale 
grassland areas oriented on meadow birds, arable areas with field margins to relative small areas with a 
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focus on the management of landscape elements. Other explanations are cultural and presence and 
availability of leadership (e.g. Polman, 2002). The attitude of farmers towards cooperation and 
responding to new challenges appeared to differ for different regions. The organisations also differ with 
respect to the ways in which they carry out agri-environmental management. Some of the groups 
entirely rely on volunteers for their activities, whereas others do also employ staff for coordination, 
administrative tasks and support on ecological knowledge. Many of these groups support their 
participants in applying for individual agreements. A large number is also involved in collective 
agreements with regional/local authorities.  
The governance arrangements of these organisations have developed in different ways, partly as a 
response to the pressure felt to show credible commitment for nature management (Polman, 2002). 
Taking initiatives to set up farmers groups to manage wildlife and landscape shows that many farmers 
are concerned about their farming environment. The local focus, the bottom-up approach, the 
participating farmer involvement and a lean organisation are important elements of their sustainable 
success. Even though they had no formal contracting role, many of ANVs contributed to the impact of the 
AES policy by facilitating the learning process within their group (e.g. by organising and/or participating 
in courses on wildlife and landscape management), and saving on transaction costs (e.g. by taking over 
paper work from farmers). They were involved in monitoring efforts that went beyond direct legal 
requirements, and occasionally introduced result based payments alongside the traditional effort-based 
compensation schemes.  
Farmer collectives (FCs) 
The latest CAP reform (CAP towards 2020) for the first time allowed member states to organize schemes 
via collective agreements with groups of farmers form 2014 and onwards (see Regulation EU, No 
1305/2013). The Dutch government, which had lobbied in Brussels for having this option, would like to 
introduce a new approach to agri-environmental service delivery, that would focus on creating good 
habitat conditions for rare species (territorial based) rather than on commitments made at farm level. 
Moreover, it would like to enhance effectiveness and improve efficiency. As regards the policy monitoring 
and evaluation one wanted a stronger focus on goals rather than on efforts or made commitments. 
Further on, it was felt that knowledge skills could be improved and that better use could be made of local 
skills and energy. Finally, one would be better able to respond to the dynamics of nature, by introducing 
flexibility to adjust measure intensity and allocation to this dynamics if this would be better for goal-
achievement (Terwan et al, 2016; Mulders, 2018). Following the CAP reform, the Dutch government 
decided that they will only contract farmer groups or collectives rather than individual farmers for the 
provisioning of agri-environmental services. No limits are imposed to the size of the farmer groups. The 
schemes remain voluntary and go beyond the relevant mandatory standards. The FCs are newly formed 
bodies, which act as applicants for AES schemes and are the final and only beneficiary. In places where 
there were already ANVs, they often initiated the new FCs, while in other areas also farmer unions took 
initiative to form FCs (Kuindersma, 2017). FCs have legal power and are the main responsible for a 
proper implementation of AES-measures. In some areas the former ANVs still exist, although their role 
changed, while in other regions they merged into farmers collectives. Collectives that emerged from 
ANVs had to determine their role with respect to the new collective (Dik, 2016). This could lead to some 
of the tasks of the ANVs being transferred to the FC, while others remained with the ANV1. Important to 
note is that tasks relating to agricultural nature management had to be transferred to the collective. 
Some ANVs were dissolved. 
The number of FCs differs by province, e.g in Flevoland, Limburg, Zeeland and Drenthe there is one 
group for the whole province, whereas in other provinces there are up to 8 groups (South-Holland). The 
areas covered by the FCs range from 16.000 ha to about 160.000 ha., of which only a limited part is 
designated for agri-environmental management. There are currently 40 FCs, involving more than 6,300 
farmers, and a managed area of 68 thousand hectares of land (BIJ12, 2016). The number of 
participating farmers is lower than the number of farmers that have been participating in the past (e.g. 
in 2007 still more than 15 thousand farmers participated (Agrimatie)). Even though the FCs cover a 
larger area than the ANVs in the past, the number of managed hectares is substantially lower than in the 
                                                 
1 The exact status and task of the old ANVs in the new framework is not yet clear. Their formal role is limited 
(they can themselves become a member of the farmer group and get some delegated tasks form the farmer 
group organisation). Their informal role is that they are active counterparts for the Dutch Ministry in the 
development and design stage of the new framework. 
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past (decrease since 2010 ranges from 37-54% depending on its measurement (Melman et al., 2016)). 
It is difficult to draw clear conclusions from these observations however, as in the past there was IF 
contracting outside ANVs and the number of farmers is steadily declining over time.  The decline in 
managed hectares could indicate a more targeted and discriminatory approach and can well lead to a 
more effective service delivery per contracted hectare than under the IF-system.  
 
In 2016, the total budget for agricultural nature management was 44.5 million euros (approximately 
€650/ha)2. The size of the farmer collectives (average approximately 150 farmer-members/collective) 
and the number of farmer groups per province depends on regional circumstances, including the past 
history with respect to the ANVs and preferences of policy makers3. The implementation costs for the 
government have been estimated to be approximately 7.1 million euro, of which about 40% was used as 
a compensation for the efforts made by the FCs (Dieleman et al, 2013; BIJ12, 2016). This is equivalent 
with an implementation cost of about €175,000 per FC, or €100/ha of managed area. In order to be 
recognized as such, FCs need to be a certified legal entity (screening). The certification involves 
administrative (organisational competences) and financial checks of candidate FCs by the government. 
The FCs play an intermediary role in between the (regional) governments and farmers. In the 
Netherlands it are the (12) provinces which are responsible for the AES localized demand articulation, 
whereas the national government define the national targets and provides a broad menu of possible 
conservation activities and payments (all listed in the Annex of the Dutch RDP). The provinces are to a 
large extent autonomous in the way they implement the policy. They can, for example, add regionally 
important species to target species list provided by the national government.  For this purpose the 
different provinces developed integral regional plans, Provincial Nature Conservation Plans (PNCPs), 
which cover their (full) territory and take into account all national and international legal obligations The 
Netherlands has. In particular the Birds and Habitats Directive plays a key role here. The measures that 
are requested will mostly on species preservation outside the National Ecological Network (NEN) and 
Natura 2000 area, with the aim to complement and provide additional support to preservation measures 
already taken in these nature-designated areas.  
In response to the provincial requests, the FCs offer a package bid, consisting of a mix of agri-
environmental measures as well as a multiannual plan expressing a longer term vision regarding the 
management of natural resources and biodiversity conservation strategy4. The offer includes a total area 
per habitat and a set of measures for maintaining and reinforcing these habitats (article 3.2 of SVNL, 
2017). The selected bids are usually subject to a process of further adjustment via a process of 
bargaining (Terwan et al, 2017). In this process the FC has at the same time to assure that its bid to the 
province matches with the activities the farmers are able and prepared to deliver. The FCs do this by 
subcontracting individual farmers or land managers for different activities in such a way that it ensures 
the agreement or collective bid it made with the authorities is satisfied. This includes regional targeting 
and fine-tuning in which the expected effectiveness of allocating certain measures to certain areas is 
usually accounted for. As argued in the literature (e.g. Westerink et al, 2017), FCs as vehicles pursuing a 
landscape approach to AES provision could be instrumental in improving the performance level. In that 
respect also other supportive activities of FCs, such as knowledge dissemination, facilitating learning 
from good practices and coordination and integration of activities, are important. 
Alongside the collective contract (6 year application), FCs have to develop annual management plans, in 
which it not only selects the appropriate conservation targets and activities (according to the contract), 
but also defines the ecological preconditions and guidelines for participants. In this process it consults 
farmers as well as conservation organisations and discusses preferences, options and possibilities. At the 
same time, FCs are assumed to provide ecological guidance for proper measure implementation and 
actively acquire desired contracts and refusing applications that do not fit in the overall plan. This is done 
by field coordinators that pay visits to the farmers that are carrying out the agreed conservation 
measures, and advise them. Part of the activities of FCs is to annually report and actively inform their 
members as well as the wider public about the well-being of the target species (Terwan et al, 2016). This 
                                                 
2 In 2017 the Netherlands shifted 20 million euro from Pillar 1 of the CAP to Pillar II, with the aim to further 
strengthen AES provision and accommodate the signals of increase in farmer interest. 
3 Individual farmers that want to participate in agri-environmental service provision can only do so by 
becoming a member of a farmer group.  
4 Initially measures will only contain agri-environmental measures. At a later stage also measures coming from 
other backgrounds (e.g. water bodies, tourism-organisations) might be integrated. 
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not only creates transparency about the effectiveness of sending public money, but also contributes to 
induce social pressure to apply measures, select locations, and cover functions (e.g. shelter places, nest 
places, foraging areas) in such a way that they contribute to support the FCs performance. 
FCs are responsible for doing controls and check. The FC is also responsible for sanctions in case 
individual farmers are detected to be non-compliant with respect to the FC-farmer subcontracting 
agreement. The FC claims the payment from the national and EU authorities and makes payments to 
farmers in accordance to the agreed subcontracts that have been made. As private organisations, FCs 
have the autonomy to develop their own service reward rules and could apply some kind of price 
discrimination with respect to low and high costs suppliers. Potentially, such redistribution could lead to a 
higher service level and a higher number of farmers participating (not further explored in this paper) that 
would have been the case under the traditional system.  
Payments are granted annually to the FCs to compensate farmers “for all or part of the additional costs 
and income foregone resulting from the commitments made”. Additional payments are possible to cover 
implementation and transaction costs (up to 20 % of the premium paid for individual famers and up to 
30% for groups of farmers and other land managers). Though a start-up phase may involve additional 
costs, the transaction costs have been indicated by several FCs to be a major concern (Secretary of State 
of Economic Affairs, 2016). Although a good evaluation procedure is welcome to determine what is 
reasonable, the private transaction costs should be recognized as being a ‘productive input’ (Jongeneel et 
al, 2016). As FCs often employ paid staff and are in need to do so to satisfy organisation requirements 
(professionalism) that is asked for, they are likely to have a minimum of fixed costs. A way to reduce 
transaction costs as a share of the volume of transactions made could be to increase scale and exploit 
economies of size. 
Figure 1 summarizes the evolution of agri-environmental management in the Netherlands. It started with 
contracts between individual farmers and the government (see left side of Figure 1). Then in the nineties 
of last century ANV type associations took the role of intermediary organisation in many regions. Since 
2016 the contractual relation is between farmer collectives and provincial governments.     
 
Figure 1  Evolution of Dutch agri-environmental management model 
 
3. Basic features of Dutch farmer group contracting 
As is known from auction theory the most significant problems in auctions and auction design are 
probably those related to how to discourage collusive, predatory and entry-deterring behaviour as they 
affect the chances to achieve a competitive and efficient outcome. The key issue here is how to ensure a 
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sufficiently competitive procurement process (Klemperer, 2004, 29).  Agri-environmental collective 
contract procurement in the Dutch agri-environmental policy approach has two economic basic features: 
First, the government, more precisely the provinces, are the major buyers and have monopsony power 
(reverse auction). They can use this power to structure to a large extent what happens at the supply 
side. As was described before they do impose requirements on the organisational structure of the farmer 
groups, which the farmer groups need to satisfy before being qualified as an acceptable potential 
contract partner. Second, the government or provinces has to make choices in what to buy (deliveries 
contract), whom to buy from (choice of contractor or farmer group), and how to buy (choice of contract 
type).  
The buyers (provinces) appear to play a very decisive role. This is illustrated by the steps the provinces 
have taken to develop procedures, define requirements and make formats and templates for the 
contractors, therewith to a large extent determining their room for manoeuvre.  As such in reality the 
process is rather top down, probably more so than Figure 1 might suggest. The degree of competition 
seems to be limited, because the capacity building activity among farmers and their associations also 
functions as a pre-selection of contract partners, which will limit competition at the suppliers’ side. This 
issue will be further explored below, when also other aspects are brought into the discussion. 
As regards the competition between the FCs as suppliers of AES services the spatial character of AES 
contracting should be acknowledged. By allowing only groups of farmer to offer bids, the number of 
competitors for a provincial ‘tender’ will depend on the number of farmer groups that can be formed, 
which in turn depends on the minimum specified for the number of farmers that should be at least 
included in a group, as well as by the farm scale (in terms of hectares of land) in relation to the total 
area in a region5. In particular, when a policy objective of the buyer is to get a balanced participation of 
suppliers or of farmers over its territory or farmers in a specific zone, this will limit the number of 
suppliers and increase the likelihood of strategic and collusive behaviour among suppliers in normal 
auctions (cf. the large demand relative to supply-argument made in Hellerstein et al, 2015). Following a 
non-auction awarding procedure, in which the buyer pre-selects a number of reputable suppliers (e.g. 
making use of the social capital of ANVs with a proven track record from the past), shares information 
with (potential) FCs, and provides funding for organisational capacity building for at least a limited 
number of most promising groups of farmers, that are evaluated to be potential reliable suppliers, can 
then in the end generate a more competitive outcome (see Tadelis, 2012).  
 
4. Contract specification 
Incompleteness 
Collective agri-environmental contracts define a 6 years results-oriented obligation to realise specific 
habitats on a specified land area (Terwan et al., 2016). An important characteristic of these contracts is 
their inherent incompleteness. Relative to the FC approach, collective contracts are more incomplete in 
the sense that many details about the activities are not known to the procuring institution. In the old 
individual system character and location of conservation activities used to be fixed for six years. The 
scheme’s flexibility in terms of the design and location of conservation activities is much more flexible 
than under the old IC-approach system. In the collective contracts a provision has been included which 
allows the FCs to adjust activities until 14 days the activity will take place (see Terwan et al., 2016). This 
has to be notified to the contracting province, which will then assure that the payments made will be 
adjusted to the change in deliveries. Due to an especially developed ICT structure, linking FCs and the 
Paying Agency, this has been made also administratively feasible. FCs as well as subcontracted farmers 
have to make investments that are specific to the relationship (cf. Polman, 2002; Steele 2008). At the 
level of the FC this implies investments necessary to become a certified professional conservation 
organisation (see Terwan et al., 2016), the generation of the social capital (including trust), and the 
investments made in creating a detailed proposal. But it is not only this, also efforts need to be made 
with respect to establishing well-functioning FC-farmer member-relationships. Because of the fear of hold 
up and policy uncertainty, farmer groups may have a tendency to underinvest, unless the policy maker 
                                                 
5 In the Netherlands no clear choices have been made about this, but different provinces seem to follow 
different strategies. This makes it difficult to evaluate the degree of competitiveness. 
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convincingly signals to be committed to support agricultural conservation efforts in the context of an 
underspecified over-arching agreement with the farmer groups  (Steele, 2008). 
Entering into an incomplete contract implies that the contracting farmer group-partner imposes a hazard 
on itself. Both the farmer group and the provincial authorities face risks when contracting. Given the 
contract incompleteness and the complexity of the services to be contracted (e.g. their impact or the 
effective constraints they generate to farmers being subject stochastic conditions such as variations in 
weather), there might arise a need for ex-post contract adaptation during the contractual relation. As is 
known from the procurement literature (see for example Steele, 2008 and Tadelis, 2012) both the 
buyers and sellers will then share uncertainty about many important contract design changes than will, 
or are very likely to occur after a contract is signed. 
Contract type and reward procedures 
Defining a collective agri-environmental contract not only requires a detailed and an as complete as 
possible specification of the obligations and deliverables a contractor has to fulfil, but also to specify a 
reward procedure. Here several options are possible, with the three options that frequently are observed 
in the literature being a fixed-price contract, a cost-plus contract and a unit-price contract6. As has been 
proved by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Tadelis (2012) in case of relative simple projects, which are 
likely to have relatively complete contract specifications, fix price procurement may be most efficient. A 
competitive auction will in that case induce suppliers to compete their surplus away and the buyer will 
procure the design at the lowest price. Fixed price contracts provide an incentive to reduce production 
costs, but hamper efficient adaptation. With complexity and contract incompleteness increasing (and as a 
result adaptations of contracts more likely occurring). contrary to the conventional wisdom, both another 
type of contract (a cost plus contract) and another allocation mode (bargaining with a reputable and 
qualified buyer) are likely to be optimal. Procuring “cost plus” contracts via an auction can create severe 
problems with adverse selection, creating a risk that the “wrong” suppliers (highest cost, least able) will 
win the contract (see Tadelis, 2012, 300 for a detailed argument). It is acknowledged that negotiated 
contracts may be less effective in selecting the lowest bidder than open auctions or tendering systems. 
But such negotiated contracts can economize on ex-post transaction costs resulting from frequent 
adaptions of the contract.  The cost savings involved with this may outweigh the gains of competitive 
bidding. Whether this will be actually the case for agri-environmental management needs further 
empirical evidence, but an empirical assessment of Bajari et al (2014) of data on 819 completed public 
highway construction contracts showed that the adaptation cost associated with incomplete contracts can 
be substantial, and maybe even more important than the standard sources of (asymmetric) private 
information and moral hazard mentioned to explain departure from efficiency in procurement. 
The new Dutch FC-approach system is clearly a single buyer procurement setting. However, as regards 
the bidding process there is a special posted price-feature phenomenon, which imposes a tight restriction 
to agri-environmental public sector procurement (see details below). As such the new Dutch 
procurement system can be characterized as unit price auction rather than as a discriminate price 
auction. An important institutional aspect is the use of the so-called Catalogue Green and Blue Services 
(CGBS) which offers building blocks for composing agri-environmental measures for individual farmers. 
This catalogue provides a pre-fixed unit price fixation for different agri-environmental measures and 
services, with the calculated compensation based on the estimated costs for providing these services by 
an “average” supplier (being an individual farmer rather than a farmer group)7. More specifically, the 
compensation for the different measures is based on the income forgone-principle, which compensates 
farmers for their efforts (costs) as well as for the revenues forgone associated with these actions. The 
measures included in the Catalogue are not only described in detail with respect to implied requirements 
                                                 
6 A fixed price contract specifies a fixed price the contractor agrees to accept in return for keeping the 
obligations and delivering the services as specified in the contract. In a cost-plus contract the contractor is 
reimbursed for the costs (labour, material, forgone revenues) she makes with an additional stipulated fee. 
Hence the costs of any adaptations are automatically compensated for by the conditions that are already 
specified in the original contract. A unit price contract can be interpreted to be a hybrid form of the previous 
ones. 
7 Rather than specifying a unique unit-price, the Catalogue specifies maximum payments by measure that fit 
within the regulation on State Aid in the European Union, where some kind of regional differentiation is taken 
into account and is agreed with by the EU Commission. The latest update of the Catalogue with the EU 
Commission dates from 2010 (see http://www.portaalnatuurenlandschap.nl/themas/catalogus-groenblauwe-
diensten/overzicht/ for further details). 
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on farmer behaviour and specifying  the set of actions  farmers have to undertake, but are also notified 
to and confirmed by the EU Commission (European Commission, 19-II-2007, C(2007) 586). Following 
this standard has as an advantage for The Netherlands is  that it by doing so can prove its accountability 
and defend oneself for example against accusations of overcompensation of (individual) farmers.  The 
Catalogue not only provides an overview of measures farmers can take on their farms, but also including 
information on the maximum payments for these measures that fit within the regulation on State Aid in 
the European Union. The budget per habitat paid to the FCs is based on the average payments per 
hectare for the different activities (Terwan et al., 2016). Note that the payment-system that the 
government applies leaves it open how the FCs will decide to internally schedule the activities and 
payments.  
The catalogue offers a toolbox or menu not only for pooling measures into packages that will be part of 
the contracts provinces will make with farmer groups, but also help to price them. Since both the buyers 
(provinces) and suppliers (farmers and their organisations such as the ANVs) are familiar with the 
Catalogue both sides can save on transaction costs when using this toolbox, rather than inventing the 
wheel anew. However, a drawback is that following this posted-unit pricing-rule will not provide any 
guarantee to the policy maker that it will achieve its policy objective with respect to the level of service 
provision (as define in the regional provincial plans). For that to achieve one should allow the farmer 
groups to specify an endogenous price as part of their bid. Following this pricing rule allows the policy 
maker to calculate a fixed price for a farmer group package-contract and then create a take it or leave it 
exchange rather than a sealed bid unit price auction.   
5. Frequency of (re-)contracting 
As regards the frequency of contracting, annual contracting rather than making a contract covering a 
multi-annual period can be beneficial for both parties since a higher contracting frequency reduces the 
time gap between unit commitment and delivery period for suppliers and therefore their risk of 
marketing their asset in a suboptimal way. Following the analysis initiated by Williamson, Slangen et al 
(2008b, 178-186) argue that when longer term commitments are involved (i.e. a collective contract with 
a 6 year duration) relational aspects in transactions become increasingly important and a market type 
allocation is often not leading to the best allocative outcome.  Moreover, increasing the contracting 
frequency allows the buyer to arrange adjustments and utilize learning and information revealing effects 
in new contracts, thereby reducing the costs associated with ex-post haggling and frictions (Hellerstein et 
al, 2015). It should be noted that such ex-post frictions cannot only lead to direct costs, but also to 
indirect costs, in terms of uncertainty for the farm businesses and a deterioration of the social (trust) 
capital and perceived fairness. The benefits of higher frequency procurement need to be weighed against 
the additional transaction costs associated with more frequent procurement. As far as increasing the 
frequency may foster collusion between suppliers and by that reducing the efficiency of the outcome this 
should be also taken into account (Latacz-Lohman and Silizzi, 2007). It may also induce risk-averse 
behavior, leading to lower results as the government or farmers may opt not to continue.  
In the Dutch system there is an institutionalized arrangement that the provinces and FCs meet twice a 
year to evaluate and (if necessary) to adjust the agri-environmental management (Terwan et al., 2016).  
Moreover, many FCs create buffers and a reserve fund for the annual payments for activities. They do 
this to on the one hand anticipate mistakes or fields of farmers dropping out. On the other hand, it offers 
them a way to adjust the FC-farmer contracts to changing circumstances, which could negative affect 
achieving the goals specified in the contract. Using slightly lower payments than the maxima allowed by 
the scheme offers the FCs the opportunity to create some financial buffer.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Table 1 summarizes the pros and cons of the farmer collective and individual farmer-approaches, 
following the key aspects as these are discussed in the previous text (including basic features, contract 
specification, and frequency of re-contracting.  
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Table 1 Qualitative assessment of the pros and cons of the farmer collective (FC)-approach to agri-
environmental contracting (using the individual farmer contracting approach (IF) as a benchmark)  
Issue FC-approach IF-approach 
Basic features Contract with farmer collective; screening of 
farmer groups; package bids; complex package 
contracts 
Contract with individual 
farmer; relatively simple 
contracts; voluntary farmer 
collaboration via ANVs 
Contract 
specification: 
incompleteness 
Incomplete contract with a composite of 
activities; build in flexibilities (provide annual 
management plans, real time notification Paying 
Agency of changes in activities up till 14 calendar 
days before the activity is undertaken); contract 
duration 6 years;  
Simple contracts with single 
activity; duration 6 years; 
posted-price (CBGS) 
Contract 
specification: 
reward structure 
Average payment per hectare of habitat 
preservation; posted-price feature (CBGS-based) 
at aggregate level being satisfied, but allowing 
flexibility with respect to FC’s payments to 
farmers; allowance for a 20% transaction cost 
mark-up 
Simple contracts with single 
activity; posted-price 
(CBGS) 
Frequency of re-
contracting 
Re-contracting after 6 years, but in meantime 
yearly adjustments possible and real time 
notification option. 
No re-contracting possible; 
farmer exist when contract 
expires, but can re-apply 
Source: based on the previous analysis 
 
Based on the previous analysis some concluding observations from our analysis can be made: 
• The switch from an IF approach to a FC-approach requires a large initial effort of both the 
government as well as the private sectors. As such the swift to an effective FC system is costly 
both in terms of time and money. However, when the transition is made, the transaction costs of 
the public sector are likely to be substantially lower relative to an IF-approach. 
• The gain in transaction costs achieved at the public side is going together with an increase of 
transaction costs on the private side. It is unclear to what extent the decline and increase in 
public and private transaction costs balance each other. For the new FCs, transaction costs 
(administration) are often still an issue of major concern and also from a procurement 
perspective they may need further analysis. 
• The FC approach to agri-environmental service delivery contracting offers potential benefits and 
flexibilities that go beyond those realized by the previous IF approach. Providing an offer/bid 
requires the FC to make a convincing plan, including a longer term vision regarding the 
management of natural resources and biodiversity conservation, where different stakeholders 
and NGO’s (bringing in different knowledge) can be involved. Moreover, FCs have an obligation 
to annually report about their activities and the well-being of target species, which makes 
failures to perform easily visible. All this contributes to landscape approach and coordination of 
activities helping to overcome the lack of regional coordination, which in the literature has been 
identified as an important factor of the poor performance of AES measures.    
• Issues of contract incompleteness, the creation of a custom made product, the spatial aspect 
and the implications this has for organizing a competitive bidding process (for a specific area and 
in addition to there being a monopoly buyer there can be a monopoly supplier), as well as the 
lack of time to specify detailed contracts can be a legitimate factor to rely on a procurement 
systems characterised by a bargaining/negotiation approach with reputable suppliers, rather 
than sticking to a competitive auction approach with several suppliers. In contrast which what 
might be suggested by the conventional wisdom in the standard auctioning literature, such a 
bargaining approach can lead to an optimal outcome. 
• The strategy followed by the Dutch policy maker to rely on the Catalogue of Green and Blue 
Services and make sure that maxima are introduces with respect to the payment for specified 
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activities is likely to contribute to reduce public as well as private transaction costs that might be 
associated by designing new collective contract in a fully open way. Moreover, it contributes to 
cope with the EU’s accountability requirements.   
• Since the (provincial) government is a monopsony buyer in its territory it can potentially use its 
buying power to determine to a large extent the conditions under which agri-environmental 
services will be delivered. When a system of FCs covering a large part of the countryside is in 
place the entry of new FCs can become complicated, even though the entry and access of 
farmers may be more flexible. Learning then becomes important to ensure quality enhancement 
and dynamic effciency gains. 
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